Fitch and Satyajit Das Explained the Credit Crash Before It Happened (2005, 2007 Reports)

Possible Effects of Overlapping Credit Markets Fitch 2005
I found a research report written by derivatives expert Satyajit Das in February 2007 titled "Credit Crash?" (Wilmott). If you want to learn about credit derivatives, this is the paper to read. The first synthetic CDO was engineered by JPMorgan in 1997, when its credit derivative team sold a BISTRO, or Broad Index Secured Offering, which allowed them to sell $10 billion of credit risk. It was done by accident to get a bonus. The report opened with a quote from Alan Greenspan on credit default swaps in 2006, who Satyajit disagreed with.
"On 18 May 2006, Greenspan (speaking at the Bond Market Association) spoke eloquently about the stabilising effect of credit default swaps (“CDS”) on the international financial system

“The CDS is probably the most important instrument in finance. … What CDS did is layoff all the risk of highly leveraged institutions – and that’s what banks are, highly leveraged – on stable American and international institutions.”

We will critically examine whether the position espoused by Greenspan is in fact true." (read more)
Near the end he provided a diagram titled "The Coming Credit Crash" which was based on this diagram from a July 18, 2005 Fitch report ("Hedge Funds: An Emerging Force in the Global Credit Markets") h/t

It is amazing how fragile this market was and how CDS failed to contain it. There was even detailed data on subprime MBS deal performance.

Question: If retail investors were able to trade senior debt, leveraged loans, ABS, CMBS and credit default swaps alongside institutional investors using an online brokerage, would systemic risk have been mitigated with increased price transparency and liquidity? It is funny to me that retail investors are "accredited" enough to blow their money on penny stocks that have no underlying revenues, earnings or even capital, but not able to participate alongside hedge fund manager John Paulson in an ABX Index for pennies betting against pools of subprime mortgage-backed securities (trading insurance). Why couldn't a discount brokerage provide deal performance from data providers Lewtan, CoreLogic or Intex, like they provide S&P reports for stocks.

Look at this chart of select tranche spreads of ABX.HE indices (06-01 BBB, 06-02 BBB, 07-01 BBB, 06-01-BBB-, 06-02 BBB-, 06-03 BBB-) from this Nomura report in 2007. The report also breaks out "deal-collateral characteristics" for each series, "deal loan characteristics", "deal underwriting analytics" and "deal prepayment speeds". Were credit hedge funds and investment banks long MBS portfolios not watching this data? Or was it strictly a liquidity problem?

Source: Nomura via

I also stumbled upon this Bloomberg oped by Paul Wilmott on May 24, 2011 titled "Bankers Can’t Avoid Risk by Hiding It".


  1. In response to your paragraph headed Question
    I fail to see much difference in risk profile between penny stocks and private equities of the sort listed by and SharesPost @dvolatility:twitter Neither is suitable for individual (retail) investors. But there is a difference in participating in the sort of debt plays you mention: Retail investors could actually make money in those deals you described! And perhaps, yes, have reduced systemic risk.Re last sentence of that same paragraph: Lipper owns (or used to own) Loan Pricing Corporation. LPC publishes,  weekly, The Gold Sheets. This would be another source of information for discount brokerages to provide to retail investors re leveraged loan performance in secondary markets.

  2. Thanks for the comment. At least someone else thinks leveling the playing field is somewhat possible. I think the secret is out now that some institutional investors are dumber than the the so called dumb money. @EllieAsksWhy:twitter 


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